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I. INTRODUCTION
"It shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys ... not to
convict, but to see that justice is done."1 The quotation from Article 2.01
of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is the logical manifestation of
the legal maxim "it is better that ninety-nine . .. offenders should escape,
than that one innocent man should be condemned.",2 It is the law of the
land; it is an ideal of our criminal justice system. However, several Texas
citizens may argue that the criminal justice system effectively denies the
individual pursuit of justice in favor of a conviction's finality and the per-
ception of justice,3 despite the fact that an increasing number of those
convicted have been proven innocent. The criminal justice process is fa-
cilitated by the legislature's failure to empower the individual defendants
with all of the resources necessary to prove their innocence. Further-
more, the judiciary is reluctant to interpret the law more liberally in favor
of the individual. The cases of Anthony Robinson, Christopher Ochoa,
Kevin Byrd, and Roy Wayne Criner demonstrate the individual costs of
that failure.
Anthony Robinson is a 41-year old Army veteran and a non-traditional
student at the Thurgood Marshall School of Law in Houston, Texas.4 He
served 10 years in prison for a rape he did not commit, receiving a pardon
from then-Governor George W. Bush in 2000.5
Christopher Ochoa confessed to the 1988 murder of Nancy DePriest
and was sentenced to life in prison. He served 12 years, but was exoner-
ated through the efforts of the Wisconsin Innocence Project.6 Mr. Ochoa
wrote the Wisconsin Innocence Project a letter requesting their help, and
1. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2.01 (VERNON 2003).
2. Arleen Anderson, Responding To the Challenge of Actual Innocence Claims After
Herrera v. Collins, 71 TEMP. L. REV. 489, 491 (1998), quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298
(1995) (discussing the realization and affect that the conviction of innocent people has on
the criminal justice system).
3. See 1 DONALD E. WILKES JR., STATE POST-CONVIcTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF
§ 3-2, at 194 (2001 ed.) (describing the counterrevolution of the Burger-Rehnquist Su-
preme Court where criminal procedure protections are given little concern and misconduct
in law enforcement is tacitly accepted).
4. Erica Lehrer Goldman, Back To Life, TEXAS LAWYER, May 13, 2002, available at
WL 5/13/2002 Tex. Law. 1.
5. Id.
6. Lessons from Ochoa's Case, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, Jan. 17, 2001, at A10.
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became the first person they helped absolve. Ochoa was released from
prison in January 2001.'
Kevin Byrd served 12 years of a life sentence for a rape he did not
commit. The victim initially signed a statement identifying her attacker
as white, but later recanted at trial and identified Mr. Byrd as the assail-
ant. Mr. Byrd is black. He was convicted despite the contradictory state-
ments and a lack of physical evidence linking him to the crime. He
gained his freedom as a result of a friend's persistence and pure luck.
Kevin Byrd was pardoned in 1997 by then-Governor George W. Bush.'
In 1990 Roy Wayne Criner was sentenced to 99 years in prison for the
aggravated rape and murder of 16-year old girl.9 The direct evidence
against Mr. Criner was weak, yet he was convicted on the basis of con-
flicting testimonial evidence about statements he allegedly made on the
day of the crime.' ° Mr. Criner eventually won his freedom, and he too
was pardoned in 2000 by then-Governor George W. Bush.
Although the facts of these cases are distinguishable, common ground
can be found in the fact that neither was found guilty of a capital crime
and each made a post-conviction claim of actual innocence using Deox-
yribonucleic acid (DNA) typing analysis.11 They represent an alarmingly
increasing number of cases nationwide, over the past decade, where con-
victed defendants have successfully asserted their innocence and won
their release from prison.' 2 A great majority of these convictions have
been overturned by the judicial system's acceptance and reliance on
DNA evidence.13
7. Id.
8. John Maekig, After 12 Years, DNA Clears Inmate In Rape Case, HOUSTON CHRON.,
July 29, 1997, available at 1997 WL 6570373.
9. See Frontline: The Case for Innocence, http:www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/case/cases/ (a television documentary based on four cases examining "where DNA
evidence has been ignored, discounted, or kept secret." This despite the fact that the "sci-
ence of DNA testing can now establish with near certainty who did or didn't commit a
crime.") (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
10. See id.
11. Compare Goldman supra note 4, with Mary Alice Robbins, Trial Judge Lacked
Jurisdiction to Order DNA Testing: Death-Row Inmate Who Wanted to Pay for Test Didn't
Meet Law's Conditions, TEXAS LAWYER, Sep. 16, 2002, available at WL 9/16/2002 Tex. Law.
9.
12. Anderson, supra note 2.
13. EDWARD CONNORS ET AL, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE., U.S. DEP'T OF JUS-
TICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF
DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL 78 (1996).
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Every state now requires a DNA analysis of evidence for specified of-
fenses. 4 However, only a handful of states have passed legislation pro-
viding a process for convicted persons to request DNA testing of
evidence for their trial. 5 Texas is one of them. The 77th Session of the
Texas Legislature passed Senate Bill 3 ("SB 3") on April 5th, 2001, and
Governor Rick Perry signed it immediately on April 5th.16 Senate Bill 3
amended chapters 38 and 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
and mandated the preservation of biological evidence for post-conviction
DNA testing.
1 7
The irony is that Robinson, Ochoa, Byrd and Criner were all exoner-
ated, pardoned or released as a result of DNA typing analysis performed
prior to the passage of SB 3. Interestingly, the law has been used to re-
strict a convicted petitioner's effort to prove innocence using DNA test-
ing.1 8 While such a narrow interpretation is troubling enough in a non-
capital case, it is more troubling when a life is at stake.
In Kutzner v. State,19 a death-row inmate relied on the statute and re-
quested DNA testing of the evidence that was used to convict him. The
trial court denied the motion and defendant appealed.2 ° The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling and held, inter alia,
that the defendant had failed to show that "the convicted person must
show a reasonable probability that exculpatory DNA tests will prove that
person's innocence. 2 ' The state released the evidence for testing soon
after the defendant was executed.2 2 In State v. Patrick,23 death-row in-
mate Jesse Joe Patrick filed a motion for DNA testing claiming that he
had no memory of the crime and offered to pay for the DNA test him-
self.24 The trial court ordered the test but again the Court of Criminal
14. Holly Schaffter, Post-conviction DNA Evidence: A 500 Pound Gorilla in State
Courts, 50 DRAKE L. REV. 695, 695 (2002) (discussing the utility of DNA testing proce-
dures in state courts).
15. Id.
16. Act of April 5, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 2 2001 Tex Gen. Laws 1-5.
17. Id.
18. Robbins, supra note 11.
19. 75 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
20. Id. at 427.
21. Id.
22. Barry Scheck, Some Prosecutors Still Are Resisting DNA Testing Law, DALLAS
MORIINcG NEWS, Sep. 27, 2002, available at http://www.dallasnews.comlopinion/viewpoints/
stories/092702dnedischeck.14137.html (last visited Jan. 18. 2004).
23. 86 S.W.3d 592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
24. Id. at 593.
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Appeals overturned the decision ruling that the defendant failed to meet
his statutory burden.25
Given the documented numbers of wrongful convictions and universal
judicial acceptance of DNA testing, why do Texas courts appear reluctant
to exercise discretion in favor of the defendant? Why do they interpret
the law so restrictively? 26 Does a defendant who raises a claim of factual
innocence have a right to DNA testing so he can prove it? Given that the
law was proposed as a legislative response to public outcry over wrongful
convictions in Texas, and its passage an emergency priority at the request
of the Governor,27 is the court's narrow interpretation of the law truly an
accurate reflection of the legislature's intent? If it is accurate, is it
justice?
This comment addresses those questions by tracing the development of
Texas's post-conviction remedies from their origins in the Texas state con-
stitution; to their refinement of the writ of habeas corpus; and to the en-
actment of SB 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Moreover, this
paper evaluates the law's effectiveness in attaining "justice" and offers
recommendations intended to bring the judiciary closer to the directive of
Article 2.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure - ... to see that justice is
done.,
28
II. HISTORY
A. Origin of Post-Conviction Remedies and Relief
The Texas Constitution is derived from a collaboration of the United
States of America's Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of
the Free and Independent Republic of Texas. 29 The result is that the Bill
of Rights in the Texas Constitution contains "greater protection of...
rights than what had been written into the United States Constitution and
25. Compare Mary Alice Robbins, Defense Lawyers Worried DNA Bill Doesn't Go
Far Enough, TEXAS LAWYER, Feb. 26, 2001, available at WL 2/26/2001 Tex. Law. 5, with
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, New DNA Law Spurs Dozens of Test Requests, Aug. 20,
2001, at 8B, and John Moritz, THE FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, DNA Testing Debated
For Man on Death Row, Sept. 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 24696437.
26. Moritz, supra note 25.
27. See Perry Declares DNA Bill on Capitol Fast Track, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 9,
2001, available at 2001 WL 2998417 (discussing the proposed DNA testing legislation); see
also, Robbins, supra note 25 (discussing the anticipated effects of the proposed DNA test-
ing bill).
28. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. §. 2.01 (VERNON Supp. 2003).
29. Arvel Ponton III, Sources of Liberty In The Texas Bill of Rights, 20 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 93, 94 (1988).
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its Bill of Rights,"3 and "positive guarantees of certain rights to the citi-
zens."'" Article I, section 10 guarantees rights for the accused in criminal
prosecutions32 explicitly stating that: "In all criminal prosecutions the ac-
cused shall have ...the right of being heard by himself or counsel, or
both, shall be confronted by the witnesses against him and shall have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor... The phrase
providing a "compulsory process..." suggests the existence of an affirma-
tive right for the individual to promote his defense, and Texas courts have
interpreted it to mean an expansion of individual rights and liberties for a
defendant facing conviction.3 4
Once convicted, a person's legal options for relief consist of either judi-
cial remedies that are available in a court of law,3 5 or non-judicial reme-
dies provided by either the executive or legislative branches of
government. 36 Non-judicial executive remedies include parole, pardons,
and commutation of sentence or clemency. 37 Non-judicial legislative
remedies provide a process for a convicted person to seek compensation
or other relief in accordance with applicable statutes, provided the con-
victed person has sufficient grounds for relief.38
B. General Grounds for Post-Conviction Relief
Appropriate grounds to support a defendant's claim for post-convic-
tion relief must include an alleged error, which if proven, would consti-
tute "a sufficient legal basis for granting the relief sought by the
movant. ' '39 The alleged error can question the conviction itself, the sen-
tence received, or the quality of the custody or punishment. 4' An alleged
error that generally warrants consideration for post-conviction relief in
state courts may be founded on either a jurisdictional or constitutional
claim, as well as fundamental error, egregious error, or newly discovered
evidence of actual innocence.4 1
30. See id. at 97 (assessing the unique combination of individual liberties in the Texas
Bill of Rights).
31. Id. at 99.
32. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 10; Ponton III, supra note 29, at 109 (explaining the individ-
ual rights established by article I, section 10 of the Texas constitution).
33. Ponton III, supra note 29, at 109.
34. See id. at 109-110 (stating that "Texas courts continue to interpret the state consti-
tution so as to protect the framers expansive view of individual rights.").
35. 1 WILKES, supra note 3, § 1-4, at 14.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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A movant stating a claim of jurisdictional error usually alleges that the
convicting court did not have jurisdiction over: 1) his or her person; or 2)
the subject at issue during trial.42 A movant's claim of sentencing error is
premised on a violation of the applicable sentencing statute. 43 Post-con-
viction relief based on jurisdictional error is available under the Uniform
Post-conviction Procedure Act.4 4
A post-conviction claim for relief based on state or federal constitu-
tional errors is the most frequently litigated issue in state post-conviction
remedy proceedings. 45 All federal and state jurisdictions provide a pro-
cess to grant relief from a state conviction when the movant is able to
prove that the applicable "statute defining the offense or prescribing pun-
ishment is unconstitutional,, 46 or the presiding courts' application of the
statute denied the movant's constitutional right resulting in conviction or
continued incarceration.47
The third basis of error considered sufficient to merit consideration for
post-conviction relief in state courts is that the movant has newly discov-
ered evidence of their actual innocence. Historically, claims of actual in-
nocence based on newly discovered evidence were not considered worthy
of relief; the claims were not considered to be jurisdictional or constitu-
tional error,48 thus the movant had to single-handedly combat the police,
the prosecution, and the judiciary for the right to argue his innocence.49
Nonetheless, the majority of states accept newly discovered evidence as
sufficient grounds for relief in accordance with their specific post-convic-
tion remedy.5" Moreover, the judicial system also recognizes numerous
cases where an innocent person was granted relief based on constitutional
grounds. 1 The judicial system also recognizes that there are an alarming
number of cases where a defendant's rights may have been fully pro-
tected, yet a conviction was entered because the defendant could not
prove his innocence.
42. Id.
43. 1 WILKES, supra note 3, § 1-10, at 39.
44. Id. at 40.
45. 1 WILKES, supra note 3, § 1-11, at 46.
46. Id.
47. Compare id., with Ex parte Elizondo, 947 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex. Cr. App. 1996).
48. 1 WILKES, supra note 3, § 1-12, at 50.
49. See id., § 1-13, at 53 (arguing that the conviction of the innocent is a major prob-
lem in our criminal justice system, yet shrouded in mystery and often ignored or even
denied).
50. See id. at 58 (stating that 38 states permit relief based on newly discovered evi-
dence of innocence).
51. Id. at 55.
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A claim by a convicted person which does not assert that any viola-
tions of his constitutional rights occurred in the proceedings leading
to the conviction, but does assert that there is newly discovered evi-
dence that he is factually not guilty of the crime for which he was
convicted, is often referred to as a "free-standing claim of
innocence.
52
The traditional common-law remedy for a free-standing claim of actual
innocence was a direct appeal to the convicting court by way of a motion
for a new trial, subject to the applicable statute of limitations.53 How-
ever, when newly discovered evidence was obtained after the statutory
limit had run, the convicted person's only recourse was to rely on the
narrower field of post-conviction remedies. 54 Thus, the majority of ac-
tions for relief based on the movant's claim of actual innocence resulting
from the presentation of newly discovered evidence were adjudicated in
accordance with the state's post-conviction remedies.
Under 19th century jurisprudence, free-standing claims of innocence
based solely on newly discovered evidence were not favored in most juris-
dictions. 56 This was true for several reasons. For one, there was a reluc-
tance to allow the movant to use a collateral attack in an attempt to re-
litigate trial issues. Second, there was a concern that material witnesses
would recant their previous testimony. Finally, courts were concerned
with upholding the judicial principle of finality.57 The principle of finality
was summarized by Judge Henry J. Friendly his 1970 article "Is Inno-
cence Irrelevant?"58 Judge Friendly described the components of finality
as follows: 1) the criminal law's interest in swift but just punishment for
its deterrent value, and the recognition that continued collateral attacks
mitigates against the convicted person's acceptance of it; 2) collateral at-
tacks are generally delayed too long, and thus subject to deterioration of
witness memory and evidence; 3) the collective drain that collateral at-
tacks place on judicial resources; 4) the fact that the vast majority of state
court convictions are sound as illustrated in "Justice Jackson's never re-
futed observation that "[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious ap-
plication to be buried in a flood of worthless ones;" and 5) societal
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 56.
57. Compare id. at 56-57, with Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 697 (1993) (Justice
O'Connor concurring in part and dissenting in part stating "the principles that inform our
habeas jurisprudence are finality, federalism, and fairness.").
58. Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judg-
ments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 149 (1970).
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conviction that at some point the appeal process must come to an end.59
Thus, the doctrine of finality appears to be a reasoned approach to bal-
ance a multifaceted problem and ultimately achieve a degree of
predictability.
Conversely, when the principle of finality is applied to free-standing
claims of actual innocence, the result has been described as "willful igno-
rance."6 There is an equally compelling rationale to continue to ques-
tion the validity of a conviction, for we can never have complete
confidence that our criminal justice system has convicted the right per-
son.61 Each release and exoneration of convicted persons confirms a fear
that the apparatus of the criminal justice system itself is fundamentally
unjust. As a result, each exoneration makes society unwilling to accept
the idea that an end has finally come in a particular case.62 As Justice
Brennan stated in Sanders v. United States, "[c]onventional notions of fi-
nality of litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake and in-
fringement of constitutional rights is alleged."63
Therein lays the inherent conflict for both courts and prosecutors in
their effort to achieve justice: obtaining balance between the competing
interests wherein "guilt shall not escape nor innocence suffer."' 6 4 Justice
must be achieved in a manner that encourages public belief and confi-
dence in the criminal justice system and its administration. Regardless of
how fervent and zealously the prosecution may believe the accused to be
guilty, it cannot pursue "guilt" at the cost of pursuing truth then shrug off
the mistaken convictions of those who are truly innocent in the war on
crime.65 If "our criminal justice system is best described as a search for
59. Id. at 146; see Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1963) (arguing for the
significance of the principle of finality despite the provisions for collateral appeals of a
criminal conviction).
60. JIM DWYER, ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER
DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 247 (2000).
61. The Innocence Project, Case Profiles, http://www.innocenceproject.org (website of
non-profit legal clinic out of the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. "The Project han-
dles cases where DNA testing of evidence can yield conclusive proof of innocence. As of
January 12, 2004, 140 convicted persons nationwide have been exonerated through DNA
testing) (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
62. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Pris-
oners, 76 HARV. L. REV 441, 443 (1963).
63. Id.
64. Anderson, supra note 3, at 491.
65. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 491, citing Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals,
Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the Innocent? 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317,
1334-1335 (1997) (suggesting that those who are wrongfully or mistakenly convicted of
crimes but are actually innocent are victims of the war on crime).
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truth, 66 then we must continue to revise and modify both our technical
abilities to find the truth and the analytical processes by which we evalu-
ate those findings.
Justice Friendly's arguments for substantive justice as the standard for
habeas corpus claims have been instrumental in the development of the
principles of finality and the judiciary's adherence to it.67 This standard
imposed a narrow and strict burden of proof until the introduction and
DNA profiling evidence in the mid-1980s. From that point forward, both
the prosecution and the defense were able to objectively consider a de-
fendant's argument of constitutional error based on the introduction of
newly discovered evidence.
C. The Role and Use of Habeas Corpus in Texas Criminal Law
The writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed by the Texas Constitution. 68 It
is the principal post-conviction remedy in Texas, 6 9 and was enacted in its
current form by the Texas Habeas Corpus Act of 199570 ("the Act"),
which required the habeas corpus process to run concurrent with the di-
rect appeals process.71
The Act brought about a complete revision of Article 11.07 which
streamlined the appellate process and made the writ applicable only to
non-death penalty cases after a final judgment. 7' The Act did not estab-
lish a statute of limitations for non-death penalty cases as it did for capital
cases, leaving some commentators to speculate that the Act was the legis-
latures' blood-thirsty and cynical expression of support for the principle
66. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES,
EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH
INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL iii (1996).
67. See Michael J. Muskat, Substantive Justice and State Interests in the Aftermath of
Herrera v. Collins: Finding an Adequate Process for the Resolution of Bare Innocence
Claims Through State Post-Conviction Remedies, 75 TEX. L. REV. 131, 134 (1996) (analyz-
ing the proper scope of federal habeas corpus remedies).
68. TEX. CONST. art. I, § 12.
69. Jack Driskill, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 11.07: The Exclusive Post-
conviction Remedy in Texas, 2 TEX. TECH L. REV. 45, 45 (1970) (discussing how the writ of
habeas corpus was the exclusive post-conviction remedy in Texas, but inadequate to ad-
dress the variety of actions brought, which led to the enactment of Article 11.07 by the
Texas legislature in 1970).
70. Acts of 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 319, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws (amended TEX. CRIM. PROC.
CODE ANN. § 11.07 and added TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11.071).
71. James C. Harrington and Anne More Burnham, Texas's New Habeas Corpus Pro-
cedure For Death Row Inmates: Kafkaesque - And Probably Unconstitutional, 27 ST.
MARY'S L. J. 69, 73 (1995).
72. TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 11.07, § 1 (Vernon Supp. 2004); 2 DONALD E.
WILKES, STATE POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF app. A at 640 (2001 ed.).
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of finality in capital cases, the goal being to "execute people as quickly as
possible." 7
3
The Act also provided some significant privileges that are not present
in other state habeas corpus legislation. Specifically, the Act provides for
the right to counsel for all indigent death-row inmates and a right to com-
pensation for expenses pursuant to the investigation supporting the
habeas corpus action. 4 Commentators have acknowledged that the Act
did not significantly narrow nor restrict the grounds available for a grant
of post-conviction relief. Twenty-five distinct sources of error are availa-
ble to a convicted person including a claim for "denial of due process of
law" and a claim of "newly discovered evidence of innocence. 75
The writ of habeas corpus is a collateral attack on a conviction which
was traditionally limited to void judgments; it was unavailable to a con-
victed person making a free-standing claim of innocence based on the
availability of new evidence. 76 The Act did not express the shortcoming
because it was not intended to provide a comprehensive post-conviction
73. Harrington and Burnham, supra note 71, at 71.
74. 2 WILKES, supra note 72.
75. 2 WILKES, supra note 72, at 648-655 (stating that the grounds for post-conviction
habeas corpus relief, whether under Art. 11.071 or Art 11.07 include the following: 1) Juris-
dictional defect in the conviction, 2) Unconstitutional statute defining the offense, 3) De-
nial of counsel in the convicting court, 4) Ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, 5)
Ineffective assistance of counsel when pleading guilty, 6) Violation of right to conflict-free
counsel, 7) Incompetence to stand trial, 8) Involuntary guilty plea, 9) Breach of plea bar-
gain, 10) Double jeopardy violation, 11) Fundamentally defective indictment, 12) Ex post
facto violations, 13) Denials of due process of law, 14) Newly discovered evidence of inno-
cence, 15) Sentence in excess of statutory maximum, 16) Unconstitutional sentence, 17)
Illegal or unconstitutional condition of probation, 18) Illegal or unconstitutional revocation
of probation, 19) Ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal or denial of counsel on
direct appeal, 20) Unconstitutional actions by parole officials, 21) Unlawful denial of credit
against the sentence of time spent in pre-conviction custody, 22) Miscalculation of parole
eligibility by prison or parole officials, 23) Unlawful denial of jail time credit for time spent
on conditional work furlough until convicted person was released on parole, 24) Illegal
denial of good time credit, flat time credit or other time credit against the sentence, 25)
The convicted person under death sentence is mentally incompetent to be executed.
76. See Driskill, supra note 69, at 54 ("A judgment is void only if the trial court lacked
jurisdiction over the person or subject matter, or subsequently lost jurisdiction because the
constitutional requirements of due process were not met. Thus, any judgment which is not
void but merely voidable is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus. Anything
which goes to the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be considered by habeas corpus.
The case in Shaver v. Ellis, 255 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1958) is a vivid example of the problem.
Shaver was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. On the eve of his execution
another inmate confessed to the crime. Shaver immediately filed for a write of habeas
corpus, which was flatly denied because the confession merely went to the guilt of the
accused and did not render the conviction void but only voidable.")
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remedy." Thus, the state post-conviction remedy was narrowly drawn
and of limited utility to a movant with a free-standing claim of innocence.
The Act was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte
Binder78 wherein it held that newly discovered evidence is not grounds
for relief under Art. 11.07. 7 9 At that time, a convicted person with a cred-
ible claim of actual innocence had no recourse in state courts and no al-
ternative other than to file a federal writ of habeas corpus in accordance
with the Supreme Court's decision in Townsend v. Sain.80 In Townsend,
the Supreme Court stated that a federal court should grant an evidentiary
hearing when a habeas corpus applicant demonstrates a substantial alle-
gation of newly discovered evidence.81
As a result, a majority of those convicted chose to bypass the convict-
ing court and submit their writ of habeas corpus directly to the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals for the express purpose of exhausting their
state claims and expeditiously move on to federal courts.82 The strategy
diminished when the Supreme Court began to close the door with its de-
cision in Brown v. Allen,8 3 which denied the federal habeas corpus writ if
the movant failed to exhaust all state remedies. Brown's holding was ulti-
mately bolstered in Herrera v. Collins, where Chief Justice Rehnquist
stated that executive clemency by the governor was the appropriate rem-
edy for meritorious claims of actual innocence, not a federal writ of
habeas corpus.84
D. Writ of Habeas Corpus after Herrera
In Herrera the movant had been convicted of capital murder and sen-
tenced to death for the 1982 murder of a police officer.8 Herrera chal-
lenged the conviction directly and collaterally with writs of habeas corpus
in both Texas state and federal courts,86 and was denied at every turn.
Ten years later he submitted a second federal writ of habeas corpus in
77. Compare Driskill, supra note 69, at 54-55, with 2 WILKES, supra note 72, at 659
(describing Texas' limited habeas corpus relief).
78. 660 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. 1983).
79. Id.
80. 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992).
81. Id.; Driskill, supra note 69, at 47.
82. Driskill, supra note 69, at 47.
83. 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953) (stating that a failure to use a state's available remedy in
the absence of some interference or incapacity bars federal habeas corpus).
84. 506 U.S. 390, 416 (1993) (Chief Justice Rehnquist asserting that executive clem-
ency is the proper remedy for claims of innocence because such claims may be abused and
disrupt the finality of court decisions).
85. Id. (holding that a claim of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence
is not grounds for federal habeas corpus relief).
86. Id.
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which he made a free- standing claim of his actual innocence based on the
discovery of new evidence.87 He argued that his pending death sentence
was a violation of both "the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment and the Fourteenth Amendment's guaran-
tee of due process of law" because he was, in fact, innocent.88
The federal district court granted a stay of the execution based on fair-
ness and due process concerns.89 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit vacated the stay and found Herrera's effort to support his claim of
innocence to be disingenuous. The Fifth Circuit held that a free-standing
claim of actual innocence based "merely on newly discovered evidence"
was not cognizable under the Townsend decision.9" The Supreme Court
of the United States ("the Court") granted certiorari and affirmed Her-
rera's conviction and capital sentence.9' In issuing its opinion, the Court
analyzed the submission of new evidence that had not been available at
trial under Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Fur-
ther, the Court identified the particular problem and decided that this
type of claim could not be judicially determined under Texas law at the
time. 92 Nonetheless, the Court assumed that a death-row inmate could
warrant relief under a federal writ of habeas corpus so long as the inmate
could raise a "truly persuasive post-conviction showing of actual inno-
cence, such that the execution would be unconstitutional, and that no
state procedures were available to review the claim. 93 The Court also
recognized that although a petitioner could make such a demonstration,
the court's interest in comity, finality of the verdict in capital cases, and
the corresponding burden on the state to respond to such a showing
would combine to render the threshold for the movant's "assumed right"
extraordinarily high.94
The Court was, in effect, sending a message to the states. For one, the
state trial was the primary venue to determine issues of guilt or inno-
cence. Second, adherence to principles of comity and finality meant that
federal habeas relief was not an available remedy to address a death-row
inmates' free-standing claim of innocence based on newly discovered evi-
dence unless the state courts did not posses a process to do so. Finally, in
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 397.
90. Id. at 397-398.
91. Id. at 398.
92. Id. at 400.
93. Id. at 417.
94. Id.
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the rare instance that federal habeas relief was a viable alternative, the
threshold to reach it would be extremely difficult."
III. EVOLUTION OF POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES AFTER HERRERA
A. Federal Law
The Court's decision in Herrera begat a string of decisions which fur-
ther defined its principles. However, none of these decisions expressly
recognized an absolute right to federal habeas relief in a post-conviction
claim of actual innocence. In Schlup v. Delo,96 Justice Stevens distin-
guished Herrera's free-standing claim of actual innocence from a less ro-
bust claim of innocence resulting from a constitutional error. When
attached to a constitutional error, the convicted person's claim of inno-
cence served as a gateway through which a petitioner had to pass so that
an otherwise barred constitutional claim could be considered on its mer-
its.97 In distinguishing the two claims, the Court articulated two stan-
dards of review. An Herrera claim of actual innocence results from a
constitutionally error-free trial where the execution of a factually inno-
cent person would violate the Eighth Amendment. The petitioner's dem-
onstration of evidence in their habeas writ would have to be so strong so
as to render an execution constitutionally intolerable even if the convic-
tion was the product of a fair trial.98 The standard of review for a Schlup
claim was not as harrowing. Here, the petitioner only had to present evi-
dence to establish sufficient doubt about his guilt and show that the con-
stitutional error probably resulted in the conviction of one who was
actually innocent.99 Thus, Schlup established the precedent for a lower
standard of review when the petitioner can show that newly discovered
evidence was not available at trial.
B. Texas Criminal Law
Following Schlup the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals decided State of
Texas ex rel. Holmes."0 In its decision, the court expressly considered the
question of a petitioner's fundamental right to demonstrate his actual in-
nocence as introduced by the Supreme Court in Herrera, and held that
95. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 496 (commenting Chief Justice Rehnquist' holding
that the state trial is the main event for determining guilt and that finality is one of the
touchstone principles defining habeas jurisprudence).
96. 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
97. Id. at 313-314 (differentiating between claims of actual innocence).
98. Id. (explaining that executing an actually innocent individual would run afoul of
the Eighth Amendment).
99. Id. at 299.
100. 885 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
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the new evidence must create "a doubt as to the efficacy of the verdict
sufficient to undermine confidence in the verdict and that it is probable
that the verdict would be different [had the new evidence been presented
at trial]." 01 Once the court was convinced that the petitioner's motion
had met this threshold, he then had to meet an equally high burden of
proof to obtain relief by showing that "no rational trier of fact [consider-
ing the newly discovered evidence within the context of the entire trial
record], could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 2
Effectively, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals expanded the scope
of the writ of habeas corpus for death-row inmates in response to the
Herrera decision. Perhaps most significant is the fact that the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals in its reasoning adopted a constitutional due
process analysis and applied it to state habeas corpus jurisprudence
thereby expanding the scope of all future appeals.10 3
The court also performed due process analysis in Ex parte Elizondo. 104
The Elizondo court held that beyond execution of an innocent person,
the due process clause forbids the incarceration of an innocent person,
thereby making the Holmes expansion of the writ of habeas corpus appli-
cable to non-death-row inmates making claims of actual innocence. 10 5
The court further refined the standard of review upon which the applicant
must meet to prevail; that is, the newly discovered evidence must "un-
questionably establish the petitioner's innocence."10 6 Seemingly, the
court appeared to have taken notice of the number of wrongful convic-
tions being overturned both within the state and around the nation. The
court had to be aware of the role that DNA evidence played in those
cases and especially the national controversy surrounding the admissibil-
ity of DNA evidence. 10 7 The court declared their predisposition to affirm
the conviction, perhaps in anticipation of similar controversy about ap-
peals in Texas. The opinion plainly stated that the review is not an oppor-
tunity for the petitioner to re-argue the evidence presented at the trial;
instead, they must present new evidence or evidence that was not
presented due to constitutional error:
We view the evidence in a manner favorable to the verdict of guilty.
In practice, this means we assume that the jury weighed lightly the
exculpatory evidence and disbelieved entirely the exculpatory wit-
101. Id. at 398.
102. Id. at 399.
103. Id. at 400.
104. 947 S.W.2d 202 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc).
105. Id. at 205.
106. Id.
107. CONNORS ET AL., supra, note 13.
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nesses. We make this assumption no matter how powerful the excul-
patory evidence may seem to us or how credible the defense
witnesses may appear. If the inculpatory evidence standing alone is
enough for rational people to believe in the guilt of the defendant we
simply do not care how much credible evidence is on the other
side. 108
The court affirmed and clarified its ruling in Ex Parte Franklin.°9 The
court held that Elizondo was intended to "act as a mechanism for freeing
the innocent, not as a vehicle for out-of-time motions for new trial." ' 10
C. Federal Impact on State Decisions
It has taken less than ten years for the post-conviction remedy of
habeas corpus to be revised so as to apply to free-standing claims of ac-
tual innocence based on newly discovered evidence or evidence that had
been un-constitutionally barred at trial. The change was premised on the
constitutional violation that would occur if an actually innocent person
were executed or incarcerated. Although its scope had been widened,
habeas corpus jurisprudence was still not comprehensive enough. When
Elizondo was decided in 1996, Texas did not have a statutory process to
evaluate a post-conviction claim of actual innocence or to compel relief
when a petitioner was able to meet their burden of proof. The shortcom-
ing was exposed continuously throughout the period between 1987 and
1996 due to the introduction of DNA profiling evidence in the courtroom.
DNA profiling evidence enabled the applicant to objectively meet the
high burden of proof as set out by the Court of Criminal Appeals in
Holmes, and affirmed in both Elizondo and Franklin. Nevertheless, there
lacked a statutory process to permit the inmate to gain access to the phys-
ical evidence, or as was often the case in capital appeals, the inmate may
have exhausted all of his appeals years earlier at a time when DNA profil-
ing was either not available, or not as capable, or the inmate may have
been barred by statutory limitation. Absent a truly persuasive showing
that the guilty verdict should be questioned, the applicant could not get
into the courtroom to prove that "no rational trier of fact would have
found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."11'
108. 947 S.W.2d at 205.
109. 72 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
110. Id. at 677.
111. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400.
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IV. DNA TESTING AS A TOOL OF FORENSIC EVIDENCE
"The thing is you don't have many suspects who are innocent of a
crime. That's contradictory. If a person is innocent of crime, then he
is not a suspect."'1
12
- Edwin Meese, United States Attorney General
"The criminal justice system is not infallible." '113
- Janet Reno, United States Attorney General
A. Role of Forensic Science
The distinction in the above-quoted statements reflects more than just
their ideological differences. Rather, it is testimony to the comprehen-
sive effects that DNA profiling and other technological advance in foren-
sic science have had on the criminal justice system. Forensic science is
generally defined as "the application of the natural and physical sciences
to the resolution of conflicts with a legal context." '114 If the highest aim of
the criminal justice system is a search for the truth, then forensic science
is an indispensable tool in the conduct of that search.1 15 Thus, it has a
symbiotic relationship with the criminal justice system. The relationship,
however, is ripe with inherent conflict because the goal of science is to
produce the truth, whereas the goal of our legal system is the achieve-
ment of justice." 6 Arriving at a legal truth, as a result of vigorous argu-
ment of the available facts, is the goal of the legal system's adversarial
nature and not just the product of rigid application and adherence to the
scientific method.
117
The role of physical evidence in the administration of justice may
reasonably be described as follows: Science offers a window through
which the law may view the technological advances of our age. Sci-
ence spreads out a smorgasbord of (hopefully) valid facts and, having
proudly displayed its wares, stands back. The law now picks out
those morsels that appear most attractive to it, applying selection cri-
teria that may or may not have anything to do with science. These
112. DWYER ET AL., supra note 60, at xi.
113. CONNORS ET AL, supra note 13, at iii.
114. John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, The General Assumptions and Rational
of Forensic Identification, in 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN & DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., MODERN
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, § 24 at 148 (2002).
115. See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 13, at 78.
116. Thornton & Peterson, supra note 114, at 149.
117. Compare CONNORS ET AL., supra note 13, at 78 with Thornton & Peterson, supra
note 114, at 149.
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selection criteria may appear sensible, even obligatory to the law, but
may appear illogical or even whimsical to science.11 8
Accordingly, the law has to explain and interpret the results of science
to make them relevant to the pursuit of justice.
B. The Development of DNA Profiling
The classic description of forensic science is the "analysis, identifica-
tion, and interpretation of physical evidence." '119 Once forensic science
techniques have produced results from analysis of the physical evidence,
the emphasis shifts to admissibility of the results by a court so they can be
considered to assist the resolution of a legal conflict.12 °
DNA typing technology was initially developed in England by Alec Jef-
freys in the 1970's, and used to assist in criminal investigations in the
United Kingdom in 1985. Forensic science was then adopted by the U.S.
Federal Bureau of Investigation in 1988.121 Its admissibility in the court-
room grew exponentially over the next decade, consistent with the emer-
gence of DNA typing as a means of discriminating between and
identifying individuals. It replaced ABO blood typing as the primary
method of individualizing physical evidence and DNA typing became
"widely viewed as one of the two most important advances in forensic
science of the twentieth century." '22 Judicial acceptance of DNA typing
occurred in five distinct phases, as reflected in the court decisions from
various jurisdictions.' 23
During the first phase, courts generally received the new science with-
out challenge. 124 The first use of DNA technology in an American crimi-
nal trial occurred in Andrews v. State125 wherein the Court of Appeals for
the Fifth District in Florida affirmed the trial court's decision to admit
"genetic fingerprint" evidence. 126 During the trial the technician who
performed the test was able to link the defendant to the biological evi-
dence taken from the crime scene by testifying that "the chance that the
DNA strands found in appellant's blood would be duplicated in some
118. Thornton & Peterson, supra note 114, at 149.
119. Id. at 152.
120. Id. at 148.
121. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON DNA TECHNOL-
OGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE, BOARD ON BIOLOGY, COMMISSION ON LIFE SCIENCES, DNA
TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 1 (1992).
122. Thornton & Peterson, supra note 114, at 175.
123. Id. at 211.
124. Id.
125. 533 So.2d 841, 851 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989), rev. denied by, 542 So.2d 1332 (Fla.
1989).
126. Id. at 850.
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other person's cells was 1 in 839,914,540. ",127 The court noted that while
this type of evidence was new to criminal cases, it was deemed admissible
principally because of its proven reliability and close relationship with
established scientific methodology. 128 Also noteworthy is the fact that the
defense did not challenge the admissibility of the evidence; they only
challenged the procedures followed by the laboratory conducting the
test.' 29
In contrast, the second phase was marked by defense efforts to chal-
lenge the admissibility of DNA typing evidence on two fronts: 1) labora-
tory control of the conditions for the analysis, and 2) interpretation of the
results of the analysis. 3 ' During this period the New York Court of
Criminal Appeals conducted the first comprehensive review of the law
governing admissibility of DNA identification evidence in People v. Cas-
tro. 13' After a twelve week hearing, the court concluded that the evi-
dence was admissible to exclude the defendant, but inadmissible to
incriminate as a matter of law due to lax handling procedures in the test-
ing laboratory. 132 The Castro ruling was significant in two respects. First,
it established the premise that DNA identification evidence was presump-
tively more admissible to exclude a suspect than to include one. 3 3 Sec-
ondly, Castro introduced an additional step to the standards which
governed admissibility of scientific evidence at the time. Not only did the
proponent have to show that the underlying science was generally ac-
cepted, but also that the method had been applied appropriately. 34
Castro and its progeny begat the third phase wherein courts found
DNA profiling evidence inadmissible due to controversy over the re-
quired probability projections. 13' During this phase the tone and tenor of
the debate between the prosecution and defense advocates were likened
127. See id. at 843-850 (addressing the admissibility of DNA identification evidence).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 3 DAVID L. FAIGMAN & DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY, § 25-1.2.1, at 212 (2002) (discussing the
historical development of DNA testing).
131. See CONNORS ET AL., supra note 13, at 78; People v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985
(1989).
132. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999 (discussing the conclusions and findings of the court
in relation to the issues presented at trial with respect to the reliability of DNA testing and
its admissibility).
133. Id. at 990; see also, EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., supra note 13, at 78.
134. See Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 998; 3 FAIGMAN & KAYE, supra note 130, at 212.
135. David H. Kaye, DNA Evidence: Probability, Population Genetics, and the Courts,
7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 101, 104 (1993).
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to "a war", 3 6 the intensity of which contributed to two National Acad-
emy of Science studies which resolved the conflict.' 37 The fourth phase
began when the forensic science community developed scientifically relia-
ble estimates in sub-population genetics which led to judicial acceptance
of the methodology.'38
We are in the midst of the fifth phase, wherein polymerase chain reac-
tion-based (PCR) DNA profiling analysis is universally accepted by pros-
ecution and defenses alike due to its increased accuracy over earlier
techniques. 139 The remaining unresolved issue is the nature of the peti-
tioner's entitlement to the test and the interpretation of the results. Es-
sentially, "DNA evidence is only as reliable as the people testing and
analyzing it.'
14 0
C. Admissibility of DNA Profiling Evidence in Federal Courts
In 1993 the Supreme Court refined the criteria for the admissibility of
scientific evidence in accordance with rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.141 In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.," 42 the
Court held that general acceptance is not "a necessary precondition to
the admissibility of scientific evidence" and that the rules assign to the
trial judge the responsibility to ensure that the expert testimony is both
reliable and "relevant to the task at hand."'1 43 The Court also provided
criteria for lower courts to follow when determining if proposed evidence
was both reliable and relevant: 1) whether the theory can be and has been
tested; 2) whether the theory or technique has withstood peer review and
publication; and 3) the expected error rate inherent in the technique and
the prevalence of controls for it. 14 4 The decision also recognized that
136. William C. Thompson, Evaluating The Admissibility of New Genetic Identifica-
tion Tests: Lessons From the "DNA War", 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 22, 23 (1993)
(describing controversies surrounding the admissibility of DNA testing results).
137. See generally, David H. Kaye, The Forensic Debut of the National Research
Council's DNA Report. Population Structure, Ceiling Frequencies and the Need for Num-
bers, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 369 (1994) (analyzing studies conducted for DNA testing
accuracy).
138. See 3 FAIGMAN & KAYE, supra note 130, at 214 (responding to DNA evidence
critics).
139. See id. at 215.
140. Study Shows DNA Results Often Contradict ID By Victim, SAN ANTONIO Ex-
PRESS NEWS, Sept. 28, 1997, at 5B, available at 1997 WL 13206992.
141. See Thornton & Peterson, supra note 114, at 173 (discussing the criteria estab-
lished to admit scientific evidence by the U.S. Supreme Court); FED. R. EVID. 702.
142. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
143. Id. at 579-580.
144. Id.
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general acceptance was a valid factor in a court's decision to admit DNA
evidence. 145
The Daubert decision is significant in that it fixes the responsibility to
assess the validity of scientific evidence with the trial court. In theory, it
should mean that courts will have the flexibility and discretion to admit
the proceeds of continued improvements in DNA technology. The ad-
vent of DNA databanks means that the amount of DNA evidence admit-
ted in a typical trial will increase over time with a proportionate increase
in its probative weight. However, this scenario will not become a reality
without some risks. Daubert is presumed to be a more liberal standard to
admit scientific evidence. In fact, it simply redirects the standard away
from the number of experts who agree and focuses on the validity of the
proposed evidence and the likelihood that the underlying techniques will
produce a false positive. 46 The testing is primarily performed by state
laboratories that also maintain the databanks, and have a vested interest
in the outcome of a trial or an appeal. Although admissibility of DNA
evidence is largely a perfunctory issue and rarely contested, we would be
wise to remember that Daubert ultimately charges the court to act as the
gatekeeper to ensure that the scales of justice remain in balance.
D. Admissibility of DNA Profiling Evidence in Texas Courts
In 1992, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that DNA profiling
evidence was admissible within the state of Texas in Kelly v. State.14 7 In
Kelly the movant, Barry Dean Kelly, petitioned the Court of Criminal
Appeals to exercise discretionary review of his 1992 murder conviction
resulting in a life sentence. The issue for the Court to determine was
whether the lower court of appeals had committed reversible error by
finding that the trial court had not abused it's discretion in admitting
DNA fingerprint evidence at trial over the appellant's objection. 4 8 In
affirming the judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeals specifically found
by clear and convincing evidence that: 1) the Restriction Fragment
Length Polymorpshism ("RFLP") technique (which identifies an un-
known sample of DNA by comparing it with a known sample) was valid;
2) RFLP itself was a valid process; 3) the RFLP process was applied cor-
rectly; and 4) the related population studies necessary to support the rec-
ognition of DNA evidence were valid and reliable.149 The court used the
145. John I. Thornton & Joseph L. Peterson, supra note 114, at 173.
146. Barry C. Scheck, DNA and Daubert, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1959, 1997 (1994).
147. 824 S.W.2d 568, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (holding that the trial court by clear
and convincing evidence, had sufficient grounds to find DNA evidence valid and relevant
to the case and therefore concluding that its admission was not an abuse of discretion).
148. Id. at 569.
149. Id. at 574.
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"clear and convincing" language of Elizondo to expressly reject the gen-
eral acceptance test of Frye, and embraced a Daubert-type analysis to
determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. The court reasoned
that the evidence was admissible if two conditions were met: 1) if the
expert testimony proved to be reliable; and 2) if the court felt it would
help the jury understand a fact in issue. Finally, in accordance with the
rules of evidence the court had to determine whether the probative value
was outweighed.15 ° Although Kelly was not the first criminal decision to
consider the admissibility of DNA profiling evidence' 51 its declarative
holding has precedental value. Hereafter, DNA evidence became admis-
sible in all criminal courts in Texas to inculpate a defendant. 152 At the
time however, there was no clearly defined process available for a defen-
dant at trial or an inmate on appeal to request DNA testing to exculpate
himself. Even if a party successfully petitioned to use DNA to prove
their innocence, the state was not required to maintain the biological evi-
dence taken from the crime scene. Thus, defendants were disadvantaged
by an inability to acquire biological evidence, or combat the incriminating
use of biological evidence by the prosecution. A convicted person suf-
fered an even greater disadvantage because they no longer had the bene-
fit of the presumption of innocence. To prevail, a convicted petitioner
had to meet a higher burden than a defendant at trial. 153 DNA profiling
evidence made it possible for an appellant to meet their required burden
if they could get the test and produce the evidence. The problem was that
without a clearly defined process to request the test, the petitioner stood
little chance of ever obtaining the evidence.
Since Kelly, criminal courts in Texas have defined and expanded the
duties and entitlements of every party involved in the use of DNA testing
evidence. In Roberson v. State1 54 the Court of Appeals in Austin ruled
that DNA evidence alone was legally and factually sufficient to prove
guilt or innocence.155 The opinion acknowledged that inculpatory eyewit-
ness testimony was not always reliable and could not stand in the face of
contradictory DNA evidence. 56 The court concluded further that incul-
150. Id. at 572.
151. See Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 165. (Tex. App.- Austin 2000, pet. ref'd).
152. See Fuller v. State, 827 S.W.2d 919, 930 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992), citing Kelly (re-
ferring to the standard of admissibility for DNA testing evidence, the proponent of such
evidence must prove to the trial court, by clear and convincing evidence and outside the
presence of the jury, that the proffered evidence is relevant; whereupon such is admissible
before the jury unless the trial court determines that the probative value of the evidence is
outweighed per Rule 403.); see also, Roberson, 16 S.W.3d at 165.
153. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
154. 16 S.W.3d 156 (Tex. App. - Austin 2000, pet. ref'd).
155. See Roberson, 16 S.W.3d at 167-172.
156. Id. at 170.
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patory DNA evidence was preferred over exculpatory eyewitness identifi-
cation. 157 Thus, the court effectively ruled that DNA evidence was
legally superior to eyewitness testimony, 158 and adopted a civil factual
sufficiency formulation for use in criminal trials, which further tilted the
scales of justice. The court's holding means that an appellant with DNA
evidence may argue that their evidence "greatly outweighs contradictory
eyewitness or circumstantial evidence to such a degree that any contrary
finding is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust" and therefore must be
overturned. 59
Kelly was issued one year before Daubert, when courts were only be-
ginning to accept DNA technology and its legal significance. Criminal
courts in particular had not been presented with DNA profiling as a
means to exculpate an accused party, nor was it a relevant factor in post-
conviction jurisprudence. Accordingly, it is understandable, albeit unfor-
tunate, that the prevailing statutory and case law was ill-equipped to con-
sider cases such as those previously discussed - Anthony Robinson and
Kevin Byrd, where the movant had maintained his innocence but did not
have the means to prove it. At the other extreme lay cases like Christo-
pher Ochoa which consisted of a facially valid conviction but resulted
from a false confession that could not stand-up to objective analysis
prompted by DNA profiling evidence. Lying somewhere between these
two extremes are cases like Roy Criner's. Mr. Criner, the accused, did
not confess and maintained his innocence; yet he was convicted. But the
coalition of politics, policy, finality, and inadequate law kept him in
prison an additional three years after his initial DNA evidence exculpated
him.160
Some commentators rationalize the outcomes of Robinson, Byrd,
Ochoa, Criner and others because DNA evidence wasn't used at the time
they were convicted and they were ultimately released and pardoned. In
reality, Roy Criner's case calls the criminal justice system's willingness to
credibly and impartially investigate a suspects' innocence, and compares
it with the prosecution's focus to incriminate and convict. Every refusal
to conduct a test or perform a check that could lead to the exoneration
and release of an innocent person validates the proposition that our crim-
inal justice system operates carelessly to convict the underprivileged and
the uninformed. 61
157. Id.
158. See id. (arguing that the perils of eyewitness identification testimony far exceed
those presented by DNA expert testimony.).
159. Id. at 172.
160. See Frontline: The Case for Innocence, supra note 9.
161. Bator, supra 62, at 442.
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V. TEXAS' DNA PRESERVATION LAW
"The State's obligation is not to convict, but to see that, so far as
possible, truth emerges. "162
- Justice Abe Fortas, United States Supreme Court
"After all, the central purpose of any system of criminal justice is to
convict the guilty and free the innocent. 16 3
- Justice Powell, United States Supreme Court
A. Senate Bill 3
Senate Bill 3 was introduced into the Texas Senate in response to what
Governor Perry declared an "emergency., 164 SB 3 passed unanimously in
both houses of the Texas legislature, 6 5 and became effective on April
5th, 2001.166 Upon signing, Governor Perry lauded the technology as an
important tool which "must be used to shed light on cases where there is
cause for doubt and biological evidence is available. . . for testing.,1 67
Although most commentators and practitioners acknowledged that the
bill would increase access to DNA evidence for certain inmates, it was
subject to immediate scrutiny by defense counsel. 16 8 The dispute cen-
tered on whether Texas courts would use their discretion to protect con-
victions of petitioners with free-standing claims of actual innocence, and
whether the movant would have a right to the test.1 69
B. Analysis of Senate Bill 3
The bill amended the Code of Criminal Procedure by adding Articles
38.39 and 64.01 through 64.05. Article 38.39 requires the state to main-
tain biological evidence taken from the crime scene (for capital felonies)
and preserve it for possible future testing until the convicted person is
either released, paroled, dies, or is executed. 170 Articles 64.01 through
64.05 provide the framework for the convicted person to submit a motion
for DNA testing to the convicting court provided that the evidence had
162. Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 98 (1963); see also, United States v. Nobles, 422
U.S. 225, 230 (1963), citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("[t]he dual aim
of our criminal justice system is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer.").
163. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398.
164. Robbins, supra note 25.
165. Act of April 5, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 2 § 2, 2001 Tex Gen. Laws 2.
166. R.G. Ratcliffe, Perry Clears Way for More Prisoner DNA Testing, HOUSTON
CHRON., Apr. 6, 2001, at 33, available at 2001 WL 3011520.
167. Id.
168. Robbins, supra note 25.
169. Id.
170. Act of April 5, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S., ch. 2 § 2, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2.
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not been tested previously due to the fault of the movant, or which may
have been tested previously using an inferior process that provided incon-
clusive results. Article 64.03 specifies that to prevail in the motion, the
movant must show, by a preponderance of the available evidence, a rea-
sonable probability that they would not have been prosecuted or con-
victed had the exculpatory results of the DNA test been available at
trial. 17
1
The bill has some advantages over similar legislation in other states. 72
First, Texas provides counsel for indigent inmates. Second, it prohibits the
court from denying identity to be in issue solely on the basis of the mo-
vant's guilty plea at trial. Further, SB 3 requires the Texas Department of
Corrections to provide written notice of the bill and its provisions to all
inmates incarcerated on September 1, 2001. Also, SB 3 permits an in-
mate possessing favorable DNA profiling evidence to submit an addi-
tional writ of Habeas Corpus even if previous writs had been denied or
dismissed by the court before the bills passage. 173
In contrast, Senate Bill 3 has received criticism for not going far
enough in protecting individual freedom and liberty.1 74 First, the bill
does not establish a right to DNA testing. It only provides a mechanism
for the movant to request testing. Furthermore, it does not allow submis-
sion of the test results to be included in a writ of habeas corpus based on
newly discovered evidence of actual innocence. 75 Also, the bill does not
create a right to relief based on favorable test results, it only provides that
a court may release the movant on bail pending the conclusion of the
court proceeding.' 76 Moreover, Article 64.03(a)(2)(A) requires that the
movant establish a reasonable probability that they would not have been
prosecuted or convicted if DNA testing resulted in exculpatory evidence.
Texas courts have consistently interpreted this provision restrictively and
have denied motions for testing. Proponents of this strict perspective as-
sert that this interpretation establishes a necessary threshold because the
purpose of Senate Bill 3 is "to free innocent people from prison" and
"not merely muddy the waters in the case". 7 7 Conversely, opponents
argue that the provision, as construed by the courts, effectively requires
defendants to prove their innocence without having the benefit of the test
results to establish their defense. 78
171. Id.
172. See 1 WILKES, supra note 3, § 1-14, at 20 (2001).
173. Id.
174. Robbins, supra note 25.
175. Id.
176. Act of April 5, 2001, 77th Leg., R.S. ch. 2 § 2, 2001 Tex. Gen. Laws 2.
177. Kutzner, 75 S.W.3d at 438-439.
178. Id.
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This restrictive interpretation is contrary to the intent of members of
the Texas House of Representatives Committee on Criminal Jurispru-
dence who voted for the approved bill in contemplation of creating a
right to testing.'79 Without a right to DNA testing, the appellant is de-
prived of exculpatory benefits if: 1) identity was not at issue during their
trial; or 2) if they were not able to show that the new evidence would
establish a reasonable probability of their innocence. This means that
Senate Bill 3 would not have been applicable to wrongly convicted people
whom we now know were, in fact, innocent. Anthony Robinson was con-
victed solely on the basis of eye-witness testimony from a victim that was
a "dream witness. . .very attractive, very intelligent, well-spoken [who]
never wavered on her identification of Robinson as being the person who
committed the crime."' ° Identity was never at issue in Robinson's trial
despite the fact that the forensic evidence, his fingerprints, did not match.
Christopher Ochoa made a false confession to murder due to police coer-
cion and intimidation and pled guilty. As such, he did not benefit from
the adversarial scrutiny inherent in a trial proceeding.181 Instead, he only
received the DNA test after contacting the Wisconsin Project who, in
turn, coordinated with the private laboratory in possession of his biologi-
cal evidence and tested it using current technology. The results proved he
did not commit the rape.18 2 Had the prosecution refused to support the
effort, or the court declined to accept the results, then Ochoa would have
been left with had no recourse under the law.
The law does not provide any recourse to a movant with a favorable
judgment if a court, in its discretion, does not choose to order their re-
lease on bail. For that reason the law would not have benefited Kevin
179. Hearings on HB 1474 Before the House Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 77th
Leg., R.S. (Feb. 13, 2001) (A statement by Rep. Hochberg declaring the intent of his bill
was to make the procedure to obtain a DNA test "as much of a perfunctory administrative
proceeding as possible."; statement by Rep. Hochberg that the adopted language of "rea-
sonable probability" in the approved bill was intentionally a lower burden for the movant
to meet then earlier language that the DNA test would show the appellant to be innocent
in reference to the case of Christopher Ochoa who gave a coerced confession.; statement
by Rep. Garcia declaring it his intention that the bill provide the appellant the right to a
DNA test regardless of his plea at trial or judicial response to the motion, further that he
sought to have such assurance in the statement of legislative intent); Mary Alice Robbins,
supra note 161 (quoting a statement by House Criminal Justice Committee Chairman Juan
Hinojosa, declaring the intent to make DNA testing a matter of right for a convicted per-
son)(tape recorded copy on file with The Scholar).
180. Goldman, supra note 4.
181. Hearings on HB 1474 Before the House Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 77th
Leg., R.S. (Feb. 13, 2001) (statement by Bill Allison attorney for Christopher Ochoa de-
claring that the bill would not be applicable to a case like Ochoa's) (tape recorded copy on
file with The Scholar).
182. The Innocence Project, Case Profiles, supra note 61.
[Vol. 6:121
BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY
Byrd, who sat in jail for an additional two and a half months while waiting
for every conceivable legal challenge to run its course. 83 Roy Criner ob-
tained not one but two favorable tests, yet remained in jail for more than
three years while the prosecution and the Court of Criminal Appeals ad-
vanced new theories that were not argued at trial, in an effort to preserve
the guilty verdict."8 Identity was not at issue in his trial because the
prosecution introduced evidence that he bragged about committing a
rape the day of the crime. He was only exonerated after a third DNA test
conclusively matched the DNA sample from a cigarette butt found at the
crime scene with the DNA extracted from semen taken from the victim,
both samples excluded Criner as a suspect. 185 The cases involving Byrd
and Criner are testaments to the imperfections within the criminal justice
system, and the role that raw luck plays in exposing them. The essential
biological evidence in Byrd's case had miraculously avoided destruction
simply because an unknown prosecutor inexplicably crossed it off of a list
of samples scheduled for destruction.' 86 Criner's case was even more ex-
traordinary in that it took a "confluence" of disparate elements to com-
bine to prove he was not guilty.' 8 7 Until then the court system had
demanded that he prove himself actually innocent.188 Criner's attorney
Michael Charlton testified before the House Committee on Criminal Ju-
risprudence that "if the proof of materiality standard had been in place
[at the time], then Roy Criner would not have benefited. Materiality
183. See Claudia Kolker, Something To Smile About/Bush To Pardon Houston Man/
DNA Clears Kevin Byrd After 12 Years in Prison, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 9, 1997, available
at 1997 WL 13070386; John Makeig, After 12 Years, DNA Clears Inmate In Rape Case,
HOUSTON CHRON., July 29, 1997, available at 1997 WL 6570373; Bush Declines Pardon For
Man In Rape Case Despite DNA Evidence Governor Rejects Advice, Prefers Judicial
Course, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 14, 1997, available at 1997 WL 11520353.
184. See Frontline, The Case for Innocence-Four Cases, supra note 9.
185. Bob Burtman, Innocent at Last: After Ten Years, Prosecutors Finally Concede
That Roy Criner Is Not Guilty And Should Be Free, HOUSTON PRESS, Aug. 3, 2000, availa-
ble at http://www.houstonpress.com/issues/2000-08-03/news.html.
186. Claudia Kolker, DNA Tests Can Free Wrongly Convicted If Evidence Survives!
Sample That Helped Kevin Byrd Almost Thrown Out of Warehouse, HOUSTON CHRON.
Oct. 13, 1997, available at 1997 WL 13075234.
187. Bob Burtman, Innocent at Last: After Ten Years, Prosecutors Finally Concede
That Roy Criner Is Not Guilty And Should Be Free, Houston Press, Aug. 3, 2000, available
at http://www.houstonpress.com/issues/2000-08-03/news.html.
188. Compare id., with Frontline: The Case for Innocence: Interview with Judge Sharon
Keller, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cse/interviews/keller.html (This is
an interview with Judge Sharon Keller of the Texas Court of Appeals. Judge Keller wrote
the majority opinion in the Roy Criner Case.) (last visited Jan. 13. 2004).
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would have been extremely difficult if not impossible to establish as a
means to get the test.' 1
89
The Texas courts of appeals have had several opportunities to consider
the materiality standard as it has been frequently raised as a point of
error in appeals to trial court denials of motions for testing. 190 In Kutz-
ner,19 1 for example, the Court of Criminal Appeals examined the lan-
guage of Article 64.03(a)(2)(A) and ruled it susceptible to differing
meanings and "therefore ambiguous." The court researched extratextual
sources to conclude that the legislative intent of the article was to require
that the movant show a reasonable probability that exculpatory DNA
tests would prove their innocence, as opposed to a requirement that the
movant prove innocence before the court would approve their motion for
the test.192 In Dinkins v. State,'9 3 the court continued to refine Article
64.03, holding that the "plain language" directs the convicting court to
order the test only when the movant makes a showing of reasonable
probability. 94 Finally, in State v. Patrick,95 the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals held that, absent the required statutory showing by the movant, the
convicting court lacked jurisdiction to order the test.' 96 Collectively,
these decisions represent the court's exercise of discretion as a sieve to
filter all motions for post-conviction DNA testing. Conservative interpre-
tation of Senate Bill 3, and Article 64.03(a)(2)(A) in particular, permits
189. Hearings on HB 1474 Before the House Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 77th
Leg., R.S. (Feb. 13, 2001) (statement by Michael Charlton, attorney for Roy Criner: "...
Had the proof of materiality standard been in place, Criner would not have benefited. Two
negative tests were considered insufficient by the court, they denied his habeas motion. It
took a third test which was a long shot; materiality would have been difficult to establish in
this case. It arose from the finding of a cigarette butt found by a reporter in the examina-
tion of photographs held by the Montgomery County Sheriffs office) (tape recorded copy
on file with The Scholar).
190. See In re McBride, 82 S.W.3d 395,395-97 (Tex. App.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (hold-
ing that the state's failure to respond to the appellants motion for DNA testing was harm-
less error if the appellant failed to meet his burden); see also, In re Fain, 83 S.W.3d 885, 889
(Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.) (ruling that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by
denying a motion for DNA testing when the inmate failed to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that a reasonable probability existed that he would not have been prose-
cuted or convicted had DNA evidence been obtained); see also, Watson v. State, 96 S.W.3d
497, 499 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.) (holding that denial of post-conviction testing
does not constitute abuse of discretion in light of defendants failure to make any showing
that a reasonable probability existed that exculpatory DNA evidence would prove their
innocence).
191. Kutzer, 75 S.W.3d at 437.
192. Id. at 437-438.
193. 84 S.W.3d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
194. Id. at 643.
195. 86 S.W.3d 592, 554-595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
196. Id.
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the court to sift through all motions for testing, approve the rare excep-
tion where the confluence of luck, diligence, and perseverance combine,
and still maintain finality in the majority of verdicts.' 9 7 Although the de-
cisions clearly lie within the discretion of the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals, they present a picture of a court that is oblivious to the public's
concern over false convictions, as well as the legislature's desire to lower
the required threshold and increase access to post-conviction testing.
Contrary to the high-minded admonitions of Justice Powell' 9 s or Chief
Justice Rehnquist,' 99 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' decisions ap-
pear to dismiss the lessons of cases like Roy Criner,2 °° where proof of
innocence is often unavailable until after testing is done.
C. The Basis of the Right to DNA Testing
In Herrera, Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to a capital defendant's
"assumed right" to make a showing of his actual innocence as a basis to
support a federal writ of habeas corpus.20 1 The Court theorized that if
such a right existed, the petitioner would have to satisfy an exceptionally
high threshold to demonstrate his innocence due to the chaotic effect a
permissive standard would have on states' interests in preserving the fi-
nality of convictions.2 °2 The Court's adherence to finality was based on
its belief that state courts are the appropriate forum to decide factual
questions of guilt or innocence.2 °3 In that context, finality was not a de-
nial of the merits of an inmate's post-conviction claim of actual inno-
cence; rather, it was an admonition that the issue must be decided in state
court for the first time. The emergence of DNA evidence as a post-con-
viction tool useful to prove an appellant's actual innocence meant that
the Supreme Court of the United States' "theoretical" discussion become
197. Hearings on HB 1474 Before the House Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 77th
Leg., R.S. (Feb. 13, 2001) (statement by Rep. Hochberg, that the reason behind his pro-
posed legislation [based on the concerns of his constituents], was to make it easier for a
convicted person to the get the (DNA) test).
198. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1963) citing Berger v. United States,
295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) ("The dual aim of our criminal justice system is "that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer").
199. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 398.
200. DWYER, supra, note 60, at 246.
201. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.
202. Id.
203. See id. at 402 (stating that "[tihe guilt or innocence determination in state crimi-
nal trials is a decisive and portentous event."); NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA
EVIDENCE, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING:
RECOMMENDATION FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 9 (1999) (stating that federal habeas juris-
prudence... views the states as responsible for correcting faulty adjudications unaccompa-
nied by a constitutional violation) at http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfilesl/nij/177626.txt.
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a realistic possibility,20 4 but it had to be accessed through a state's own
judicial or legislative process, not the federal courts. The Court provided
a framework for the states to develop their processes with several key
decisions. In Brady v. Maryland,2 °5 the Court held that the suppression
of evidence favorable to an accused, upon request, violates due process
where the evidence is shown to be material as to either guilt or punish-
ment.20 6 In Arizona v. Youngblood,2 °7 the Court held that a law enforce-
ment agency's failure to preserve evidence is not a denial of due process
unless the person can show that the evidence was destroyed in bad
faith.20 8 In Ake v. Oklahoma,2 °9 the Court held due process requires that
states provide an indigent defendant access to a psychiatrist. 210 And, in
Little v. Streater,21 the Court held that a state's denial of blood grouping
tests violates due process of indigent defendants.2 12
Brady, Ake, and Streater present a foundation for supporting a peti-
tioner's right to DNA testing. In Streater, a putative father appealed a
Connecticut Superior Court judgment identifying him as the father of an
illegitimate child and denying his motion for state funding of a blood
grouping test which he argued would exclude him as a parent. In revers-
ing the judgment and remanding the case, Chief Justice Burger's decision
recognized that the petitioner's due process claim was premised on the
"unique quality of blood grouping tests as a source of exculpatory evi-
dence, [and] the state's prominent role in the litigation.... ,213 The Court
held that denial of the test solely due to the state's refusal to pay for it
resulted in considerable risk that an indigent defendant would be errone-
ously judged the father since the test had a recognized capacity to exclude
falsely accused fathers and acted as a procedural safeguard necessary to
overcome Connecticut's "onerous" evidentiary rule that "a reputed fa-
ther's testimony alone was insufficient to overcome the mother's prima
facie case." '2 14 Further, the Court ruled that the state was "inextricably
involved in the paternity litigation" and responsible for the imbalance
between the litigants by "creating the adverse presumption regarding the
204. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, NAT'L INST. OF JUST., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUST., POST-CONVICrION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATION FOR HANDLING
REQUESTS 19 (1999) at http://www.ncjrs.org/txtfilesl/nij/177626.txt.
205. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
206. Id. at 85.
207. 488 U.S. 51 (1983).
208. Id. at 58.
209. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
210. Id. at 83.
211. 452 U.S. 1 (1981).
212. Id. at 2.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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putative father's testimony by elevating the weight of the mother's impu-
tation of him.",215 The Court concluded that it was a violation of the due
process clause for the state to deny "a conclusive means for an indigent
defendant to surmount that disparity and exonerate himself.,
216
It is clear that the Court's affirmation of an indigent petitioner's right
to state funded exculpatory evidence is not the legal equivalent to an ap-
pellant's request for post-conviction DNA testing in a criminal case.217
Nonetheless, the heightened burden which the movant must meet to pre-
vail, and the probative and conclusive nature of the test results to either
exculpate of inculpate the applicant are directly analogous. The issues
confronting the courts when considering a motion for post-conviction
DNA testing are: whether the conclusive nature of DNA testing evidence
is certain enough, to overcome state interest in preserving its conviction,
and if so, whether denial of the requested test violates the appellant's due
process rights. It is settled that courts now hold forensic DNA testing
admissible.2" 8 What remains unanswered is judicial willingness to level
the playing field by correcting the imbalance between the movant and the
state by recognizing the movant's right to DNA testing and the attendant
basis for trial court jurisdiction and discretion to order the test in the
interests of justice. This issue was raised as a question of first impression
by Judge Cochran in the dissent to Patrick.2" 9 The Jurist noted that courts
have "inherent and implied powers that provide a broad foundation on
which they act,''22° and that the legislative intent behind SB 3 was to free
the innocent by "increasing the trial court's post-conviction jurisdiction
and judicial authority to order DNA testing."22 Thus Judge Cochran
concluded that the trial court's order of DNA testing despite the mo-
vant's failure to meet the statutory burden was not clearly outside the
intent of the law and did merit future debate.222 Although the issue may
215. Id.
216. Id. at 12.
217. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 204.
218. Compare Streater, 452. U.S. at 7 (discussing the admissibility of human blood
grouping tests to determine paternity; "[T]here is now practically universal and unanimous
judicial willingness to give decisive and controlling evidentiary weight to a blood test exclu-
sion of paternity.") with Kelly, 824 S.W.2d at 571(". . DNA identification evidence has
been held admissible by virtually every appellate court that has considered the question.");
Roberson, 16 S.W.3d at 165, quoting Paul C. Giannelli, The DNA Story: An Alternative
View, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 380, 380-382 ("DNA identification is generally ad-
missible in most American jurisdictions. No other scientific technique has gained such
widespread acceptance so quickly and no other technique has been as potentially valuable
to the criminal justice system.").
219. Patrick, 86 S.W.3d at 598.
220. Id. at 600.
221. Id. at 602.
222. Id.
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not yet be ripe for direct consideration, cases such as Robinson, Byrd,
Ochoa, Criner and those that follow will shorten the wait. They are con-
tinual reminders that "a wrongly accused person's best insurance against
the possibility of being falsely incriminated is the opportunity to have the
testing repeated., 22 3
Jurisdictions across the nation have applied the principles of Brady,
Ake, Streater and their progeny to buttress the argument supporting a
movant's right to DNA testing. In Dabbs v. Vergari 24 a New York ap-
peallate court granted a petitioner's motion for DNA testing notwith-
standing the absence of a statutory post-conviction discovery process.
The court referenced Brady and declared that the petitioner had a consti-
tutional right to "be informed of exculpatory evidence known to the
state.''225 In State v. Thomas,22 6 the Superior Court of New Jersey held
that a lower court was in error in denying the defendant's motion for
DNA testing of a rape kit until sentencing. 2 7 The lower court denied the
motion solely because the petitioner breached a procedural limitation.228
The appellate court ruled that the prosecution's identification evidence
was inconsistent and conflicted, and therefore not sufficient to sustain a
procedural bar to the defendant's motion. The court stated as follows:
Under these circumstances, consideration of fundamental fairness
demands that the [DNA] testing of this now 7-year old rape kit mate-
rial be done now.... Our system fails every time an innocent person
is convicted, no matter how meticulously the procedural require-
ments governing criminal trials are followed. That failure is even
more tragic when an innocent person is sentenced to a prison
term.... We regard it as important to rectify that failure.... There
is a possibility, if not a probability, that DNA testing can put to rest
the question of defendant's guilt .... We would rather [permit the
testing] than sit by while a [possibly] innocent man... "languishes in
prison while the true offender stalks his next victim. 229
Thus, the court affirmed a belief in substantive fairness and the rele-
vance of DNA testing to resolve questions of guilt or innocence in non-
223. Roberson, 16 S.W.3d at 163.
224. 570 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1990).
225. Id. at 767; see also, NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra
note 204, at 12.
226. 586 A.2d 250 (1991).
227. Id. at 253.
228. Id.; see also, NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note
204, at 12.
229. Thomas, 586 A.2d at 253; see also, NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA
EVIDENCE, supra note 204, at 12.
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capital cases. In Sewell v. State,23° an Indiana court of appeals granted an
inmate's motion for testing of a rape kit ten years after his conviction.231
The decision is instructive because it applies the Supreme Court's reason-
ing in Streater to recognize that advances in technology can render previ-
ously immaterial biological evidence relevant and probative at a future
date.
The most promising decision advocating an appellant's right to DNA
testing is Cherrix v. Braxton.232 In granting the petitioner injunctive re-
lief, the court held that the federal statute empowering a district court to
provide reasonably necessary investigative and other services to an indi-
gent defendant in support of their habeas petition also applies to DNA
testing when the appellant makes the required showing.233 The court
took judicial notice of Virginia's recent experience with other falsely con-
victed inmates, gave deliberate reflection to Cherrix's persuasive showing
of reasonable necessity and the state refusal to test, and denied the state
motion for a writ of mandamus prohibiting the test thereby ordering the
Assistant Attorney General to take steps to preserve the evidence and
transfer it to a laboratory for testing because it was reasonably necessary
to support the writ of habeas corpus.23 4 Thus, a federal district court has
established the precedent that an appellant has a right to DNA testing to
support a claim of actual innocence.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
"0 God, our Father,.. .Strengthen and increase our admiration for
honest dealing and clean thinking, and suffer not our hatred of hy-
pocrisy and pretence ever to diminish. Encourage us in our en-
deavor to live above the common level of life. Make us to choose
the harder right instead of the easier wrong, and never to be content
with a half truth when the whole can be won., 2 3 5
- Cadet Prayer, United States Military Academy at West Point
"You should never be ashamed of the truth., 236
- Travis Bishop, Constable Montgomery County Texas
230. 592 N.E.2d 705 (1992).
231. Id. at 707-708; see also, NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE,
supra note 204, at 12.
232. 131 F.Supp.2d 756 (E.D. Va. 2000).
233. Id. at 762.
234. Id. at 773-786.
235. UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY, BUGLE NOTES, 20 (1977).
236. See Bob Burtman, Innocent at Last. After Ten Years, Prosecutors Finally Concede
That Roy Criner Is Not Guilty And Should Be Free, HOUSTON PRESS, Aug. 3, 2000, availa-
ble at http://www.houstonpress.com/issues/2000-08-03/news.html.
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To prevent the continued miscarriage of justice reflected in the cases of
Robinson, Byrd, Ochoa and Criner, chapter 64 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure requires revision. First, the legislature should adopt
and incorporate the five classification categories promulgated by the Na-
tional Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence for evaluation of
cases where a motion for post-conviction DNA testing is submitted.237
Further, the legislature should create a statutory right to DNA testing for
convicted persons in categories one and two. Moreover, the convicting
courts should be empowered to order DNA testing at their discretion in
furtherance of the interests of justice. Also, chapter 64 should be
amended to mandate that a convicted person who makes a favorable
showing of his innocence using newly discovered DNA evidence be re-
leased on bail within thirty days of the convicting courts finding.
A. Statutory Right to DNA Testing.
Article 64.01 should be amended to incorporate the five classification
categories described by National Commission on the Future of DNA Evi-
dence; further, the legislature should establish statutory rights to DNA
testing on behalf of those convicted inmates whose cases fall into catego-
ries one and two. Cases in category one, where both the defense and
prosecution agree to the need for DNA testing, should be exempt from
the requirement to show a reasonable probability that they would not
have been prosecuted or convicted. Therefore, the court order for testing
would be perfunctory. For those cases falling into category two, the mo-
vant should still have a right to the test, and the exculpatory results
should then be submitted to the court for consideration in light of all of
the evidence.
This amendment would have directly affected the cases of Anthony
Robinson and James Byrd where eyewitness testimony was the only evi-
dence linking them to the crime.238 Christopher Ochoa's case is perhaps
the prime example for recognition of a claimant's right to exculpatory
procedures as a counter to improper or illegal police or prosecutorial mis-
conduct that results in a wrongful conviction. Without recognition of a
right to exculpatory DNA testing on behalf of the movant, then the jus-
tice system essentially concedes the pursuit of justice to the presence of
outside actors such as the Wisconsin Project or the Innocence Project.
237. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 204, at 3.
238. Compare Goldman, supra note 4 with Kolker, supra note 183.
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B. Judicial Discretion
Article 64.03 should be amended to empower the convicting court to
order DNA testing at its discretion in the pursuit of justice. Further Arti-
cle 64.03(a)(2) should be revised to include language that the movant's
showing of reasonable probability be judicially construed to ensure that
justice is done.23 9 This amendment, coupled with the movant's statutory
right to testing discussed above, would be the best ways to ensure that
courts are not constrained by rigid adherence to principles of finality to
the detriment of justice.
The amendment would also empower the court to recognize, at its dis-
cretion, that the tools used to demonstrate innocence will facilitate justice
and will continue to evolve. 4 ° Thus, courts need the flexibility to take
advantage of those tools at their discretion.
Another factor supporting a right to DNA testing is the recognition
that the prosecutorial uses of DNA testing evidence will continue to
grow. Within Texas, legislation is being proposed to grant civilian author-
ities the right to access military personnel's DNA samples. 241 Nationally,
Virginia has convicted and executed an inmate based solely on a "cold-
hit" match between his sample contained in the state's DNA database
and biological evidence from a previously unsolved crime.242 Similarly,
an intermediate court of appeals has ruled that DNA evidence alone is
sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt in a criminal trial.243 Commentators
have even begun to advocate compulsory DNA testing for unsolved rape
cases as an exception to the Fifth Amendment prohibition against self-
incrimination.244 No one advocating justice can argue against the widest
239. Hearings on HB 1474 Before the House Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 77th
Leg., R.S. (Feb. 13, 2001) (testimony from former Court of Criminal Appeals Justice Char-
lie Baird that the proposed DNA preservation bill should include language that the legisla-
tion is intended to see that "justice is done") (tape recorded copy on file with The Scholar).
240. See Herrera, 506 U.S. at 431.
241. Jonathan Osborne, DNA Sampling of Sex-Crime Suspects Is Off to Slow Start,
Travis County Set to Begin, AUSTIN AMERICAN-STATESMAN, March 29, 2002, available at
2002 WL 48118515; Melody Mcdonald, Grant to Help Crime Labs Handle DNA Tests, THE
FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 22, 2002, available at 2002 WL 101969313; John W.
Gonzalez, Victim Assails Army for not Matching DNA Sooner, HOUSTON CHRON., May 5,
2002, available at 2002 WL 3260989.
242. Bill Baskerville, Cold Hit Execution Set in Virginia, DNA Database Found Match,
SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, March 11, 2002, available at 2002 WL 13906686.
243. See Roberson 16 S.W.3d at 170 (arguing that the perils of eyewitness identifica-
tion testimony far exceed those presented by DNA expert testimony).
244. See generally, Stephanie A. Parks, Note, Compelled DNA Testing in Rape Cases:
Illustrating the Necessity of an Exception to the Self-Incrimination Clause, 7 WM.& MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 499 (2001) (discussing how in the last 15 years, DNA fingerprinting has
assisted in the incrimination and exoneration of those accused of rape).
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possible use of DNA technology to resolve open crimes, not even the
perpetrators. 245 Although it is disappointing, and somewhat hypocritical,
that prosecutors are reluctant to expand the exculpatory use of DNA test-
ing simply to preserve the integrity of a conviction,246 it is also under
standable because they are advocates in the criminal justice system.
What is detestable is judicial complicity in their refusal. Fundamental
fairness demands that in order to deny a person's liberty, the prosecution
be certain enough of the conviction to allow DNA testing whenever bio-
logical evidence is available.247 Justice demands that DNA evidence be
used to exclude to the same degree that it is used to incriminate and con-
vict; only then will the scales of justice regain their desired balance.
C. Compulsory Relief
Article 64.01 should also be amended to mandate that once the con-
victing court finds that the DNA testing results are favorable to the con-
victed person, that court shall order release on bail within 30 days. This
amendment is necessary to prevent any possible recurrence of a case such
as Roy Criner. In its current form, chapter 64 only provides a statutory
process for the petitioner to move for the DNA test, it does not compel
the court to grant relief. Justice dictates that the law consider favorable
DNA results sufficient impetus to mitigate the presumption of guilt im-
posed on a convicted person. Judicial reasoning traditionally views the
introduction of newly discovered post-conviction evidence with skepti-
cism. Nevertheless, DNA evidence provides an objective means of rebut-
tal. DNA testing evidence is more than negative evidence2 48 that would
not guarantee a "more accurate determination of guilt or innocence,
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at a future proceeding. To the contrary, its probative value is such that
"[t]he question is not whether a second trial would be more reliable than
the first but whether, in light of new evidence, the result of the first trial is
sufficiently reliable for the State to carry out... [its] sentence., 250
245. See Baskerville, supra note 243.
246. Diane Jennings, Clarity Urged On DNA Law, DALLAS MORNING NEWS Sep. 4,
2002.
247. Hearings on H.B. 1474 Before the House Comm. on Criminal Jurisprudence, 77th
Leg., R.S. (Feb. 13, 2001) (statement by Michael Barnard, Deputy District Attorney, Bexar
County, Texas, indicating that his office would agree to DNA testing because the confi-
dence in their convictions) (tape recorded copy on file with The Scholar).
248. Frontline: The Case for Innocence, Interview Judge Sharon Keller, supra note 188.
249. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403.
250. Id. at 435 (dissenting opinion of Justice Blackmun).
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VII. CONCLUSION
"So justice is far from us.... We look for light, but all is darkness,
for brightness but we walk in shadows, like the blind we grope along
the wall, feeling our way like men without eyes .... We look for
justice, but find none. ' 251
- Judge Michael K. Mayes, Montgomery County, Texas
On August 15th, 1987, Judge Michael K. Mayes ordered the release of
Roy Criner on bond pending the signing of his pardon by Governor
George W. Bush. In his order of release and recommendation for a par-
don that he signed July 28th, 2 Judge Mayes addressed both Mr. Criner
and his family, urging him not to be vengeful. He stated that justice was
not a static entity, but a living process that would not ignore conclusive
evidence which the state could not dispel beyond a reasonable doubt, and
which ultimately acted to free him.253 His words were eloquent, and can-
not be ignored. Justice must continue to adapt and evolve, and it cannot
be denied. The development of DNA testing, both to exclude and incrim-
inate, is simply just another step in its continuing evolution.
251. Ex parte Criner, No. 87-09-00591-CR-(1) (410th Dist. Ct., Harris County, Tex.
Aug. 15, 1987).
252. Id.
253. Id.
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